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Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
----------091422Z 110007 /41
O 090702Z FEB 77
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2025

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 SEOUL 1132

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EXDIS

MESSAGE 6 OF 8

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR PINT KS US

SUBJ: US-KOREAN POLICY: HUMAN RIGHTS.

I. STATE OF THE PROBLEM
BY FAR THE MOST INTRACTABLE ISSUE FACED IN US-ROK RELA-
TIONS IS THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE, WHICH INVOLVES BOTH TREAT-
MENT OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT. ON
ONE HAND, PRESIDENT PARK'S AUTHORITARIAN STRUCTURE IS
REPUGNANT TO AMERICAN VALUES AND IS THE BASIS FOR WIDESPREAD
AMERICAN CRITICISM OF OUR COMMITMENT TO KOREA'S DEFENSE. ON
THE OTHER HAND, PRESIDENT PARK IS ADAMANT IN HIS DEFENSE OF
HIS GOVERNING SYSTEM AS ESSENTIAL TO EFFECTIVE DEFENSE AND
CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF KOREA. THE UNSPOKEN RATIONALE FOR
HIS SYSTEM IS THE ASSURANCE FOR REMAINING IN POWER. IS THERE
A BASIS OR MEANS FOR RECONCILATION ANDNARROWING THIS
GAP ON HUMAN RIGHTS?

II. CONSIDERATIONS

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A. CURRENT STATUS AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS: PRE-
VIOUS EMBTELS, INCLUDING OUR MOST RECENT ASSESSMENT
(SEOUL 1062) AND LATEST SURVEY ON HIMAN RIGHTS (SEOUL 381)
PROVIDE FULL ANALYSIS. IN ESSENCE, PRESIDENT PARK'S
YUSHIN SYSTEM LEAVES SCOPE FOR PERSONAL FREEDOM AND
CRITICISM, PARTICULARLY IN ECONOMIC AREA, BUT SCARE
LEEWAY TO CHALLENGE ESSENCE OF AUTHORITARIAN SYSTEM OR

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CONTINUED RULE BY PARK. OPPOSITION FROH BOTH WITHIN AND
OUTSIDE RULING ESTABLISHMENT IS CONSTRAINED. MOST
SEVERELY DEALT WITH ARE ANY EXTRA-LEGAL ATTACKS ON THE
SYSTEM, SUCH AS STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS.
THE YUSHIN SYSTEM, DESPITE ITS DETRACTORS, WORKS
AND IS SUPPORTED BY MANY AND IS ACCEPTED, IF NOT ENTHUSIAS-
TICALLY, BY MOST OTHER KOREANS. PARK'S FOCUS AND SUCCESS
ON PROVIDING DEFENSE AGAINST THE NORTH AND CONSTANT
IMPROVEMENT IN THE STANDARD OF LIVING MEET THE BASIC NEEDS
OF THE POPULACE. THE RURAL SECTOR HAS PARTICULARLY BENE-
FITTED AND PARK HAS FIRM SUPPORT AND RESPECT FROM THE
MILITARY, BUREAUCRATIC AND NEW INDISTRUAK/MANAGERIAL
ELITES. HIS POLITICS DO NTT SATISFY THE MINORITY OF
BETTER-EDUCATED KOREANS AND THOSE INFLUENCED BY WESTERN
MORAL STANDARDS WHO RESENT THE CONSTRAINTS ON OPPOSITION
AND CRITICISM, BUT HAVING LITTLE CHOICE ALL BUT A HANDFUL
ARE PREPARED TO LIVE WITHIN THE SYSTEM. THE MOST ADAMANT
OPPOSITION AND THE MOST FEARED BY PARK ARE TH UNIVERSITY
STUDENTS, WHO TRUE TO BOTH KOREAN AND ASIAN TRADITIONS,
SEE THEIR UNIVERSITY YEARS AS THE ONE PERIOD FOR REBEL-
LION AGAINST AUTHORITY WHETHER IT BE AGAINST STATE OR
FAMILY CONTROL.
FROM A GOVERNING VIEWPOINT, THE WEAKNESSES OF THE
AUTHORITARIAN YUSHIN SYSTEM ARE NOT THAT IT DOES NOT PRO-
VIDE POLITICAL STABILITY FOR THE PRESENT, BUT THAT IT
DEPENDS TOO LARGELY ON THE JUDGEMENT OF ONE MAN WHO HAS
BECOME PROGRESSIVELY ISOLATED AND WOULD LEAVE A POTENTIAL
POLITICAL VACUUM IN POST-PARK PERIOD. AS LONG AS REGIME
CONTINUES TO MEET THE MOST BASIC NEEDS OF PEOPLE, IT IS
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NOT LIKELY TO DRIVE OPPOSITION TO PRO-COMMUNIST
DISAFFECTION, BUT IT COULD LEAD TO A POST-PARK PERIOD OF
CHAOS AND DISORDER. HOWEVER, WITH OR WITHOUT PARK, THE
COMPULSIONS FOR SOCIAL ORDER AND CONTROL AUTHORITY ARE
STRONG IN KOREA ANDLIKELY TO PREVAIL.
IT IS THE EMBASSY'S JUDGMENT THAT PARK COULD
PRUDENTLY RELAX HIS CONTROLS WITHOUT WEAKENING HIS GOVERN-
ING AUTHORITY. IN FACT, THERE IS A PROSPECT HE WILL MAKE
SOME CONCESSIONS TO THE OPPOSITION IN THE NEAR FUTURE. BUT,
HE IS FAR LESS LIKELY TO REVISE THE YUSHIN SYSTEM PER-
MITTING A REAL CHALLENGE TO HIS CONTINUATION IN OFFICE.
AND, THE PROSPECT IS THAT EVEN A MODERATE RELAXATION
OF CONTROL WILL ONLY WHET THE APPETITE OF PARK'S MORE
ADAMANT OPPONENTS, PARTICULARLY THE STUDENTS, LEAD TO
ANOTHER CYCLE OF STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND OTHER TESTS
OF THE LIMITS OF PARK'S TOLERANCE, AND A SUBSEQUENT
CRACKDOWN AND REVERSION TO TIGHTER CONTROLS.

B. PARK'S POSITION: PRESIDENT PARK IS FIRMY CON-

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VINCED THAT THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO HIS YUSHIN SYSTEM.
HIS MILITARY AND CONFUCIAN ORIGINS LEAVE LITTLE TOLERANCE
FOR THE "WASTEFULNESS" OF MORE DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURES.
THIS VIEWPOINT IS REINFORCED BY HIS IMPATIENCE TT PUSH
KOREA RAPIDLY INTO MODERN INDUSTRIALIZATION WHILE
HUSBANDING ENOUGH OF HIS SPARSE RESOURCES FOR DEFENSE.
PARK, MOREOVER, AFTER 16 SUCCESSFUL YEARS IN POWER, SEES
HIMSELF AS INDISPENSABLE AND IS UNWILLING TO SHARE HIS
POWERS WITH POWERFUL SUBORDINATES. AS A RESULT, HE IS

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
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NOW SURROUNDED BY ABLE BUT POLITICALLY POWERLESS TECH-
NOCRATS WHO HESITATE TO CONTRADICT OR PRESENT A DIVERSITY
OF VIEWS. IN PROPER CONFUCIAN STYLE, PARK IS PREPARED TO
DISPENSE BENEFITS TO THE POORER SECTORS OF SOCIETY AND TO
PREEMPT HIS OPPONENTS, BUT HE IS UNPREPARED TO RESPOND
TO DEMANDS AND PARTICULARLY TO PRESSURE. PARK, IN FACT,
IS BEHAVING VERY MUCH AS MOST KOREANS EXPECT THEIR LEADERS
IN ANY ORGANIZATION TO BEHAVE, STANDING TOUGH IN CONFRONTA-
TIONAL SITUATIONS. RECOGNIZING THIS ATTITUDE, PARK IS
SHREWD IN GUAGING THE POLITICAL TEMPER OF HIS COUNTRY
AND DEMONSTRATING PRAGMATIC FLEXIBILITY, WHEN NECESSARY.
IN THIS PERSPECTIVE, PARK APPROACHES THE HUMAN
RIGHTS ISSUE WITH NO SYMPATHY FOR ITS INHERENT VALUES AND
A DEEP CONVICTION THAT A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM IS NOT ONLY
UNWORKABLE IN KOREA BUT DANGEROUSLY VULNERABLE TO NORTH
KOREAN EXPLOITATION OR MISINTERPRETATION. HE ARGUES
THAT SOCIAL DISCIPLINE IS ESSENTIAL TO THE IMPOSITION OF

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SACRIFICE, MILITARY SERVICE, AND PREPAREDNESS NECESSARY FOR
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND DEFENSE. IN HIS VIEW, EVEN THE
LIMITED DEMOCRACY OF THE PRE-YUSHIN PERIOE WAS A FAILURE
SINCE THE OPPOSITION ACTED IRRESPONSIBLY WITHOUT REGARD
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FOR THESE FUNDAMENTAL NEEDS OF THE COUNTRY AND FOMENTED
STUDENT UNREST. THE EXPERIENCE OF VIETNAM ONLY REIN-
FORCED THIS CONVICTION.
AMERICAN APPROACHES ON HUMAN RIGHTS GET VERY LITTLE
UNDERSTANDING FROM PARK AND PRESSURES ARE RESISTED. YET,1
0-4(#8&#)6 ;-)73 #8 -.348:-, 43)-58ONSHIP (WHILE
RESENTING ITS CONSTRAINTS ON HIS INDEPENDENCE), AND WILL
OFFER GESTURES AND CONCESSIONS TO AMERICAN CRITICISM ON
HUMAN RIGHTS. BUT, THEY ARE IN HIS TERMS JUST THAT--
GESTURES WHICH CAN BE REVERSED IF THE OPPOSITION PRESSES
FOR MORE CONCESSIONS. IN FACT, PARK HAS GIVEN EVERY
INDICATION THAT HIS LAST FORTRESS IS HIS DETERMINATION TO
RULE KOREA INTERNALLY AS HE SEES FIT. THIS IS ONE REASON HE HAS
CANCELLED HIS NUCLEAR AND ADVANCED WEAPONS PROGRAMS AND
WILL LIKELY PROVE FLEXIBLE ON TROOP REDUCTION.

C. THE OPPOSITION: THE OPPOSITION TO PARK STEMS
FROM MIXED MOTIVES: THERE ARE THOSE WHO RESENT AUTHORITY,
PER SE, A TRADITION CURRENT IN KOREA AND PARTICULARLY
PRONOUNCED AMONG THE STUDENTS; THERE ARE THOSE MOTIVATED
BY CONVICTION AND DEEP MORAL VALUES, PARTICULARLY THE
CHURCH GROUPS AND INTELLECTUALS; AND THERE ARE THOSE WHO
RESENT BEINL SHUT OFF FROM SHARING POLITICAL POWER
BUT WOULD BEHAVE VERY SIMILARLY IF IN POWER. AT PRESENT,

THE OPPOSITION IS LARGELY IMPOTENT AND NOT PRONE TO
CHALLENGE PARK. ITS LEADERSHIP HAS LITTLE ACTIVIST SUP-
PORT, ALTHOUGH BROADER PASSIVE SUPPORT BUT STILL HAS ONLY
A MINORITY. IT HAS FAILED SO FAR TO PROJECT REALISTIC
ALTERNATIVE NATIONAL POLICIES TO MEET KOREA'S REQUIREMENTS
AND MUST STILL LIVE DOWN THE MEMORY OF THE INEPTNESS OF
THE PRE-COUP GOVERNMENT. AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE MORE OUT-
SPOKEN OPPOSITION LEADERSHIP, SUCH AS KIM DAE JUNR AND
SOCIAL-MINDED CHURCH GROUPS, PIN THEIR CURRENT HOPES NOT
ON INTERNAL SUPPORT BUT EXTERNAL U.S. PRESSURE. IT HAS
HIGH EXPECTATIONS OF EFFECTIVE INTERVENTION ON THE PART
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OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION AND WILL DIRECT ITS APPEALS
TO IT.

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THE DILEMMA OF THE OPPOSITION IS TO CHOOSE BETWEEN
SEEKING MODERATE, GRADUAL CHANGES IN THE YUSHIN SYSTEM
AND DIRECT ACTION TO THE POINT OF FORCING PARK'S REMOVAL
IN THE NEAR TERM. MTDERATION IS LIKELY TO BE ACCEPTABLE
TO PARK AND BRING SOMEWHAT GREATER FREEDOM, BUT LEAVES IN

DOUBT ANY FUNDAMENTAL EVOLUTION FROM AN AUTHORITARIAN
STRUCTURE. DIRECT ACTION, ON THE OTHER HAND, WHILE A MORE
STRAIGHTFORWARD APPROACH, IS LIKELY TO BE DIVISIVE AND
THOROUGHLY REPRESSED. THE OPPOSITION LEADERSHIP IS
CLEARLY DIVIDED ON THIS KEY ISSUE AND THUS EVEN LESS

POTENT.

D. PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY: EVEN WITHOUT PARK'S
REPRESSION, THE SEEDS FOR A WORKING DEMOCRACY IN KOREA
ARE SPARSE AND NOT DEEPLY ROOTED.DESPITE THE LARGE
CHRISTIAN MINORITY AND THE CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF WESTERN-
EDUCATED IN THE ESTABLISHMENT, KOREA IS ESSENTIALLY A
CONFUCIAN SOCIETY, GROUP-RATHER THAN INDIVIDUAL-ORIENTED

WITH A SOCIAL STRUCTURE FROM THE FAMILY UP ORGANIZED ALONG
AUTHORITARIAN LINES. THE PAST EXPERIENCE WITH DEMOCRACY
AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS HAS BEEN BRIEF, INEPTLY
ADMINISTERED, AND NONE TOO SATISFACTORY TO THE BROAD
POPULACE.
YET, THE SEEDS ARE THERE. THERE IS GROWING RESPECT
FOR INDIVIDUAL AND HUMAN VALUES, A TRADITIONAL RESENTMENT
OF AUTHORITY, A DESIRE FOR PARTICIPATION IN DECISION-
MAKING WITHIN THE SYSTEM. PERHAPS MOST ENCOURAGING IS THE
GROWTH OF NEW POWER CENTERS--MAINLY THE BUREAUCRACY AND
ECONOMIC LEADERSHIP--PREPARED IN THE LONGER TERM TO CHAL-
LENGE THE MILITARY MONOPOLY OF POWER. PARK'S RURAL COM-
MUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM MAY ALSO BREED MORE GRASS ROOTS
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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
----------091432Z 110127 /42
O 090702Z FEB 77
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMHEDIATE 2027

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DEMOCRACY AND INDEPENDENT LEADERSHIP. OVER THE LONGER TERM, A MORE BALANCED POWER STRUCTURE COULD RESULT IN A MORE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM.
BUT SUCH A SYSTEM WILL HAVE A DISTINCT KOREAN FLAVOR AND NOT NECESSARILY MIMIC WESTERN INSTITUTIONS. IN THE SHORT TERM, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES ARE DIFFICULT TO PROJECT, BUT THERE ARE MORE FERTILE GROUNDS FOR EXPANDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, SUCH AS WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND GREATER LEGAL PROTECTION, EVEN WITHIN THE PRESENT MIX OF MODERNIZING AND CONFUCIAN INFLUENCES.

E. U.S. LEVERAGE: PRESIDENT PARK IS DEEPLY CONSCIOUS OF AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR GREATER HUMAN RIGHTS IN KOREA AND HAS SIGNALLED HIS CONCERN ABOUT THE PROS-PECTIVE POLICIES OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION IN THIS FIELD. HE AND, PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANT, HIS PRINCIPAL SUPPORTERS, ARE EQUALY AWARE OF KOREA'S CONTINUED NEED FOR U.S. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC BACKSTOPPING.
UNDER PRESSURE, CONCESSIONS HAVE AND WILL BE MADE TO SALVE AMERICAN OPINION, BUT THEY WILL BE MARGINAL, REVERSIBLE, AND NOT FUNDAMENTALLY ALTER THE AUTHORI-TARIAN SYSTEM. PARK AND HIS SUPPORTERS HAVE STOOD FIRM TO THEIR CONVICTIONS IN THESE AREAS AND WILL ACT TO DISCOURAGE
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AMERICAN PRESSURE ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE. SO FAR, AMERICAN LEVERAGE WHEN APPLIED, INCLUDING REDUCTION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE, HAS PROVED LARGELY UNPRODUCTIVE AND PARK HAS PROBABLY ASSUMED WE SOUGHT FACE-SAVING COSMETICS RATHER THAN REAL RESULTS. HE HAS GAMBLED THAT, IN OUR OWN INTERESTS, WE WILL ESCHEW THE ULTIMATE WEAPONS--WITH-DRAWAL OF MILITARY OF FINANCIAL (MAINLY COMMERCIAL BANK

CREDIT" SUPPORT. OUR DIRECT LEVERAGE IS LIMITED WITHOUT THREATENING THESE STEPS--AND IF WE THREATEN, WE CANNOT AFFORT TO BLUFF. BUT THERE MAY BE LESS DIRECT LEVERS AVAILABLE TO US; CONSISTENCY OF POLICY, AND APPROACH BASED

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MORE ON PARK'S SELF INTERESTS RATHER THAN APPEASEMENT OF

CONGRESS, AND POSITIVE INCENTIVES THRU OFFERING THE POSSI-
BILITY OF A MORE EMBRACING AND DURABLE RELATIONSHIP WITH
THE U.S. BUT ONE BASED ONLY ON SHARED VALUES. SUCH
AN APPROACH MIGHT WELL CONVINCE PARK TO START ON THE ROAD
BACK TO A MORE RESPONSIVE, DEMOCRATIC AND LESS AUTHORITARIAN
SYSTEM.

III. OPTIONS
THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE MUST BE PURSUED, CONSISTENTLY
AND CONSTANTLY, PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY, DESPITE PARK'S DISTASTE
FOR IT. THE CHOICES FACING US ARE TACTICAL: THE
DEGREE OF DIRECT LEVERAGE; COSMETICS AS AGAINST
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE; SHORT-TERM AS AGAINST LONGER-TERM
GAOLS. AND, EVEN THESE CHOICES MAY BE AN ILLUSION AND A
MULTIPLE APPROACH MAY BE DICTATED BY DEVELOPMENTS. AS
A FIRST STEP, WE SHOULD CLARIFY IN OUR OWN MINDS THE
DEFINITION OF "HUMAN RIGHTS" AS IT PERTAINS TO KOREA.
IT WOULD BE ILLOGICAL AND UNWARRANTED TO EXPECT THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A WESTERN-STYLE DEMOCRACY. WE SHOULD
THEREFORE ESTABLISH OTHER GOALS AGAINST WHICH WE COULD
MEASURE ROKG ACTIONS. AND, WHATEVER OUR TACTICS, WE
MUST DEAL NOT ONLY WITH THE PARK GOVERNMENT BUT WITH
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THE OPPOSITION. IN SUPPORTING ITS STANCE ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, WE RUN THE RISK OF ENCOURAGING RESISTANCE TO
PARK IN THE EXPECTATION OF GREATER DIRECT AMERICAN INTER-
VENTION THAN WE CAN DELIVER. THE OPPOSITION MUST UNDER-
STAND THE LIMITS OF AMERICA'S CAPABILITIES IN THE HUMAN
RIGHTS FIELD.

A. LEVERAGE: RESTRT TO THE MOST POWERFUL LEVER,
OFFERING ACHOICE BETWEEN SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS OR LOSS OF SUPPORT, MIGHT SUCCEED, BUT IT IS
MORE LIKELY TO BE RESISTED ON NATIONALISTIC GROUNDS,
PARTICULARLY IF THE CHOICE APPEARS TO KOREANS AS BETWEEN
BARK PERSONALLY AND U.S. SUPPORT. IF PARK RESISTS AND
WE DRAW BACK, OUR TOTAL INFLUENCE WILL BE ERODED.
OTHER DIRECT PRESSURES OFFER LESS POTENTIAL LEVER-
AGE, AND LESS LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS. HOWEVER, EVEN THE
CONSTANT REMINDER TO PARK THAT HUMAN RIGHTS ARE AN
INTRINSICALLY IMPORTANT ISSUE TO TXE U.S. WITHOUT THE
THREAT OF PUNITIVE ACTION WILL INEVITABLY INFLUENCE HIS
DECISIONS ON DEALING WITH THE OPPOSITION. IN FACT, MORE
LEVERAGE MAY BE AFFORDED BY TACTICS OFFERING POSITIVE
REWARDS, RATHREG THAN BY PRESSURES THREATENING WITH-
DRAWAL OF SUPPORT. ADDITIONALLY, AND PERHAPS EARLY ON,
CRITICISM OF NORTH KOREAN AUTHORITARIAN RULE WOULD GIVE

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BALANCE AND MORE CREDIBILITY TO OUR CRITICISM OF PARK.

B. COSMETICS VERSUS FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE: PARK IS A
PAST MASTER AT SHIFTING GEARS AND ALTERHATING HARD ANE
SOFT LINES, ELIMINATING ONE SET OF EMERGENCY RESTRICTIVE
DECREES AND THEM IMPOSING ANOTHER. COSMETICS AND WINDOW
DRESSING TO SATISFY BOTH DOMESTIC AND U.S. PRESSURES ARE
NOT UNTYPICAL. IN THIS CONTEXT, PARK MAY WELL BE PERSUADED
TO RELEASE THE MYONGDONG DEFENDANTS AND MODIFY EMERGENCY
DECREE
NO. 9, PARTICULARLY IF HE CAN FIND SOME MEANS TO
NEUTRALIZE A FREED KIM DAE JUNG AND DAMPEN OPPOSITION
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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2028

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EXPECTATIONS THAT THE U.S. WILL INTERVENE EVEN MORE
FORCEFULLY TO SUPPORT THEIR CAUSE. BUT, THESE GOALS,
AS MERITORIOUS AS THEY MAY BE, ARE NOT LIKELY TO ALTER
YUSHIN AUTHORITARIANISM. THE ISSUE FACING US IS HOW
MUCH EMPHASIS TO GIVE SUCH GOALS AS AGAINST URGING A
BROADENING OF HUMAN AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, WHICH MAY
HAVE A LESS DRAMATIC, BUT A MORE LONG-LASTING, IMPACT.

C. SHORT VERSUS LONG TERM: GIVEN THE GREATER DEGREE

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OF PROMISE FOR GREATER DEMOCRACY IN THE LONGER TERM, THE
ISSUE IS HOW MUCH EMPHASIS TO GIVE SHORTER-TERM OBJECTIVES

IN
THE HUMAN RIGHTS AREA. SOME EMPHASIS IS INEVIT-
ABLE SINCE IMMEDIATE ISSUES SUCH AS THE MYONGDONG
DEFENDANTS CANNOT BE IGNORED. BUT, SHOULD THE THRUST OF
OUR HUMAN RIGHTS STRATEGY BE DIRECTED AT LONG-TERM GOALS,
TWO APPROACHES ARE WORTHPCONSIDERATION. FIRST, WE CAN
THROUGH A VARIETY OF PROGRAMS FOSTER THE EXPANSION OF NEW
CENTERS OF POWER BALANCING THE MILITARY, AN INSTITUTION BUILD-
ING APPROACH FOCUSSED ON POWER CENTERS RATHER THAN THE
MECHANICS OF GOVERNING. SECOND, WE CAN OFFER KOREA AND
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PARK A POSITIVE INCENTIVE-THE CHOICE BETWEEN A LIMITED
RELATIONSHIP BASED ON COMMON STRATEGIC INTERESTS BUT LACK-
ING THE DEGREE OF INTIMACY AND FAVORED TREATMENT RESERVED
FOR OUR CLOSER ALLIES, AND A FULL RELATIONSHIP OFFERING
KOREA A MTRE PERMANENT PLACE IN THE AMERICAN ALLIED ORBIT
AND AN ACCEPTED ROLE IN THE DEVELOPED WORLD (INCLUDING
OECD MEMBERSHIP), BUT ONE WHICH CAN ONLY BE BASED ON
SHARING OF COMMON VALUES, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS. THIS
VISION, PARTICULARLY AS IT OFFERS A RELATIONSHIP MORE
AKIN TO THE US-JAPANESE TIE, WILL HAVE A STRONG ATTRACTION
TO KOREA.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, POLICIES, HUMAN RIGHTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 09-Feb-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977SEOUL01132
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770046-0447
Format: TEL
From: SEOUL
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770258/aaaabzgq.tel
Line Count: 471
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: ddd318c9-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS, STADIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 9
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS, STADIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags: ANOMALY
Review Date: 08-Mar-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3364403
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: US-KOREAN POLICY: HUMAN RIGHTS. I. STATE OF THE PROBLEM BY FAR THE MOST INTRACTABLE ISSUE FACED IN US-ROK
TAGS: PFOR, PINT, KS, US
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkvgwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/ddd318c9-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009